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Contrary to popular belief the Constitution does not specifically
provide for the separation of church and state. Further, nowhere
in the Constitution is there mention of a "wall of separation between
church and state." Instead, the first amendment opens with the
words, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ." The provision
that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion is commonly referred to as the establishment clause, and the
provision that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free
exercise thereof is called the free exercise clause. These terse pro-
visions are to be borne in mind along with the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment containing the prohibition: "[N]or
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law," in the discussion which follows, for they are
the sole constitutional provisions on which rest the decisions of the
Supreme Court on the subject of prayer and Bible reading in the
public schools.'
The first of the recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court concerning prayer in the public schools was made in the case
of Engel v. Vitale,2 decided in 1962. A district board of education
in the State of New York, acting in its official capacity under the
state law, directed that the following prayer be said aloud by each
class at the beginning of each school day:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country.
3
This prayer was composed and recommended for such use in the
public schools by the State Board of Regents, a body having super-
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
The only other Constitutional provision relating to religion is the prohi-
bition found in article six against any religious test for office under the
United States. This provision, of course, is not applicable to the present
discussion.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8Id. at 422.
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visory powers over the state's public schools. No student was
obliged to participate in the prayer or to be present when it was said
if he or his parents objected.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with only one Justice
dissenting, decided that such composing and use of the prayer was a
violation of the above quoted establishment clause of the Constitu-
tion. The Court reasoned that the use of the prayer was a religious
activity; that it was part of a governmental program to further
religious belief, and that therefore it was a breach of "the constitu-
tional wall of separation between Church and State."4 Further, it
emphatically stated that the establishment clause plus the due
process clause prohibit government, state or federal, from compos-
ing5 or prescribing' official prayers for use as part of any program
of governmentally sponsored religious activity.
In the course of its opinion the Court expressed principles and
views which would do far more besides outlawing prayer in the
public schools. In comparing the meanings of the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause the Court used this significant
language: "When the power, prestige and financial support of gov-
ernment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevail-
ing officially approved religion is plain."'7 In this language, as will
be explained later, the Court laid down a basis for invalidating, if it
chooses, many other long continued religious practices and ex-
pressions in American public life.
The second of the Court's recent decisions concerning prayer
in the public schools was made in School Dist. v. Schempp,s decided
in 1963. This decision arose from two lower court cases. In the
first of these a statute in Pennsylvania required that at least ten verses
from the Bible be read at the opening of each public school on each
Id. at 425.
The Court stated that the establishment clause, "must at least mean that
in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a re-
ligious program carried on by government." Ibid.
6 Id. at 430.
71d. at 431.
8374 U.S. 203 (1963).
'Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D.Pa. 1962), aff'd, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) and Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962),
rev'd 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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school day. At the school involved, the daily opening exercises in-
cluded Bible reading and also recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The
students and their parents were advised that any student might absent
himself from the classroom where the reading and prayer took place,
or if he remained, he might refrain from participating. In the second
case the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore adopted a rule
providing for opening exercises in the city schools including Bible
reading and/or the Lord's Prayer. Students whose parents so re-
quested were excused. The Court in each case held that the prayers
and Bible reading violated the establishment clause of the Consti-
tution. Again only one justice dissented.
The Court, in its discussion of the establishment clause, expressed
far reaching views and principles. First it pointed out that it had
already been stated that neither a state nor the federal government
can pass laws which aid one religion or all religions." Then quoting
with emphatic approval from a previous dissenting opinion of Justice
Rutledge," the Court stated that the purpose of the first amendment
"was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres
of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively for-
bidding every form of public aid or support for religion."' 2 To this
end the test of invalidity under the establishment clause was stated to
be: "[W] hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enact-
ment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution."'"
The majority opinion quoted the statement in the Engel case
concerning placing "the power, prestige and financial support of
government" behind a particular religious belief.' 4 Further, Justice
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, commented on the Engel case,
stating that New York, in authorizing the Regents' prayer, had acted
contrary to the establishment clause "when it placed the 'power,
prestige and financial support of government' behind the prayer."' 5
The constitutional ground for both decisions is the provision of
the first amendment that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
10 374 U.S. at 216, citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
" Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 10 at 31-32.
2 374 U.S. at 217.
1 Id. at 222.
"Id. at 221."Id. at 264.
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establishment of religion .... ." When local school authorities pro-
vide for voluntary prayer and Bible reading in a school's opening
exercises it is obvious that Congress has not made a law, and the
constitutional provision appears not even remotely applicable. But
the fourteenth amendment reads, "[N] or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
What is included in the "liberty" here mentioned? The Supreme
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut' said that the liberty embodied in
the fourteenth amendment includes the liberties guaranteed by the
first amendment, and therefore the fourteenth makes the state legisla-
tures as incompetent as Congress to enact laws respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 17
There is plausibility in saying that "liberty" includes the constitu-
tional prohibition against laws impairing the free exercise of religion;
and under the facts of the Cantwell case which directly raised this
question,"8 that was all the Court needed to say. But the Court went
beyond what was actually before it for decision and stated that
the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment includes the
prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion.
Later in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,'" another case involving only
the free exercise of religion, not the establishment clause, the Court
again said that the fourteenth amendment makes the first, including
the establishment clause, applicable to the states.20 Other cases,2 '
including both prayer decisions, have repeated the same doctrine,
usually citing one or both of these earlier cases.
The process has, then, become one of broad synthesization in the
decisions involving the religious provisions of the first amendment.
Moreover, as demonstrated, the Court in a particular decision has
made statements going far beyond the case in hand. Then it has
used such statements as authority for later holdings, thus extending
the area of the constitutional prohibitions.
" 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17 Id. at 303.
" The case involved a prosecution for violation of a statute requiring per-
mission of an administrative officer to solicit funds for a religious cause.1 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
20 Id. at 108.
"' School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Torcasso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 309 (1952) ; Illinois ex ret. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 210 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
[Vol. 42
THE PRAYER DECISIONS
Since in each case the point was irrelevant to the decision, the
Court did not explain in either Cantwell or Murdock why "liberty"
in the fourteenth amendment includes the establishment clause of the
first.22 The opposite would seem to be true. The language that a
state shall not deprive any person of liberty "without due process of
law" does not appear to have any relation to the prohibition against
making any law respecting an establishment of religion. Could such
a law be made with due process of law? Certainly if the framers of
the fourteenth amendment really had intended by it to prohibit the
states from making any law respecting an establishment of religion it
would have been easy for them to say so, with the first amendment
before them as a model,2 3 rather than leaving the prohibition to be
arrived at by the Court by a dubious interpretation of their lan-
guage.
2 4
Moreover, the establishment clause is a prohibition on Congress
in making laws. If the fourteenth amendment extends the first to
the states it would seem, as stated in Cantwell12 5 to be a limitation on
legislatures in making laws. But the Court in later cases said that
the limitation is on the conduct of governments, state and federal.28
Thus the Court makes the establishment clause apply not just to
" It has been pointed out that the establishment clause was applied by
the Court to the states without argument or reasoning. Comment, 57 Nw.
U.L. RBv. 578, 585, 590 (1962). Thus this exceedingly important constitu-
tional doctrine came about by statement and reiteration, not by reasoned
decision.
"An amendment called the Blaine Amendment which did provide that
no state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion was
before Congress in 1876, but was lost in the Senate. Down to 1929 it was
reintroduced twenty times without result. Corwin, The Supreme Court as
National School Board, 14 LAw & CoNmmp. PROB. 3, 17 (1949) ; Comment,
64 HAv. L. Rv. 939 (1951). What could not be enacted into the Constitu-
tion by the constitutional processes, the Court read into the Constitution.
" Dean Griswold points out that it took "some rather broad construing"
to make the first amendment applicable to the states. Griswold, Absolute
Is lit the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to
Constitutional Question, 8 UTAu L. Rav. 167, 171 (1963). "To get the
establishment clause 'incorporated' into its [the fourteenth amendment's]
words calls for quite a constructional wrench." Sutherland, Establishment
According to Engel, 76 HAnv. L. REV. 25, 41 (1962). Corwin, supra note 23
at 19, and Long, Is the First Amendment Made Applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth?, 49 A.B.A.J. 345 (1963), argue that "liberty" in the four-
teenth amendment does not include the establishment clause.
2" 310 U.S. at 303.
"Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); see notes 5-6,
supra.
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Congress, or state legislatures, but also to school boards. Probably
under the Court's view, even a teacher could not voluntarily say a
prayer in a public school classroom, since she is an agent of the gov-
ernment. There are those who think this is a very good thing, but
it is a long way from anything said in the Constitution.
By prohibiting laws respecting an establishment of religion the
framers of the first amendment did not intend to prohibit prayer and
Bible reading in the public schools. This is obvious, since at the time
of the enactment of the amendment there was no public school
system.2 7 At that time schools were private, and they were largely
owned and operated by religious groups and denominations.28
Prayer in these schools was accepted practice,29 and religion was
regarded as a principal subject for study. 0 If the fourteenth amend-
ment did make the establishment clause applicable to the states, its
intended meaning was made applicable too, and as demonstrated it
could not have been intended to mean that prayer in any of the
schools was prohibited.
If no support can then be found for the conclusion that the
framers of the first and fourteenth amendments intended to invalidate
prayer and Bible reading in the public schools,81 it remains only to
examine the broad principles the Court has laid down to justify the
holdings, in order to see if such principles are supported by the
language of the amendments, the intent of their framers, or the
history, traditions, practices and beliefs of the nation.
"' School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 238 & n.7 (1963) (concurring
opinion); Comment, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 73, 81 (1963).
28 School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 27. The public school system in
this country is there shown to date from the 1820s and 1830s. Justice Jackson
dates it from about 1840. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23 (1947)
(dissenting opinion).
" Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, -, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 470 (Sup. Ct.
1959), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960), af'd, 10 N.Y.2d
174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
"0 The Northwest Ordinance for the government of the territory of the
United States northwest of Ohio, adopted in 1787 by Congress under the
Articles of Confederation, provided, "Religion, morality, and knowledge,
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools
and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." 1 Stat. 51, 52 n. (a),
Art. I1 (1787).
" Justice Brenan concurring in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237-38 (1963), concedes that the framers of the establishment clause
gave no "distinct consideration" to whether the clause forbade devotional
exercises in public institutions.
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The Court repeatedly refers to the "wall of separation" between
church and state prescribed by the Constitution. 32 As previously
noted, no wall of separation is mentioned in the Constitution. In-
stead the phrase comes from a letter written by Jefferson years after
the adoption of the first amendment, in which he stated that the
purpose of its provisions was to erect such a wall. 3 In opinions on the
religion provisions of the first amendment the Justices have given
great weight to views expressed by Jefferson and Madison on the
ground that both were influential in bringing about adoption of the
provisions. The Court has referred to Madison as the author of the
amendment,34 and also as its "architect." 35 However, Madison was
not the draftsman of the amendment. He did draft a proposed amend-
ment, but it was not adopted. The adopted amendment was instead
drafted in committee 0 at a time when Jefferson was not even in the
country.37 This does not indicate that his views were not influential-
doubtless they were-but his absence impairs his position to state with
authority what the amendment as drafted was intended to mean. It
seems unwarranted to ascribe the views of these two Virginians to
the representatives of the other states who participated in drafting
and ratifying the first amendment. Especially is this true in view of
the fact that a number of those states had established churches at the
time,3" and the amendment's provision that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion not only prevented Con-
"Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
" The letter was written by Jefferson in 1802. Comment, 63 COLUm. L.
REv. 73, 82 n.66 (1963).
" Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962).
" McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961). In Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (dissenting opinion joined by Justices Burton,
Frankfurter and Jackson), Justice Rutledge refers to the first amendment as
"the compact and exact summation of its author's [Madison's] views formed
during his long struggle for religious freedom." By the double jointed process
of first naming Madison as the author and then importing his views into
the amendment the Justices read into the amendment much more than it
says. The dubious validity of so doing is emphasized by the fact that Justice
Rutledge conceded in a footnote that Madison's draft of the amendment was
not adopted. Id. at 39 n.27.
O Corwin, supra note 23, at 11-12.
He was in Paris. Id. at 13.
'8Id. at 11-12.
1964]
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gress from making an establishment of religion but also from inter-
fering with those established. 39
If Jefferson and those who felt as he did wanted to provide a wall
of separation they could have framed a provision saying so, but
whether they could have had it adopted is another matter. The long
and short of it is that no such provision was adopted. "[W] hat was
submitted for ratification was the text of the First Amendment, not
Jefferson's figure of speech."4
The Court has not stopped with construing the first amend-
ment to require this wall of separation. No church was involved in the
prayer decisions. Religion was. The Court has made separation of
church and state mean separation of government from religion.
Certainly no such thing as this was intended by those who framed
and enacted the first amendment. The first Congress which proposed
the amendment also provided for chaplains in both Houses and the
armed forces.4 It is unlikely that the same Congress which made
such provisions also intended to make them unconstitutional under
the amendment it proposed. The Declaration of Independence had
already announced the common conviction of our revolutionary fore-
fathers as to the source of the rights later contained in the Constitu-
tion when it was stated that "[A] 11 men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights."
Beginning with George Washington and continuing to John
Kennedy it has been the practice of Presidents of the United States
upon taking office to ask the help of God.4" Oaths of office by federal
statute conclude with the words, "So help me God."43 The sessions
of the Supreme Court itself are opened with the cry, "God save the
United States and this Honorable Court."44 Our Presidents annually
proclaim a national day of Thanksgiving, and Thanksgiving Day is
a legal holiday by resolution of Congress.45 It is prescribed by resolu-
"9Id. at 12.' Fahy, Religion, Education, and the Supreme Court, 14 LAW & CoNnflMP.
PROB. 73, 83-84 (1949). That Jefferson's views were not fully shared by his
contemporaries is made plain even by a writer arguing for his views. Konvitz,
Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONTrMP.
PRoB. 44, 57, notes that Jefferson, as President, refused to proclaim fasting
and thanksgiving "as my predecessors did."
'1 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 n.1 (1962) (concurring opinion).
,21d. at 446 (dissenting opinion).
•3 REv. STAT. § 1757 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1958).
"Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
"55 STAT. 862 (1941), 5 U.S.C. § 87b (1958). One of the last messages
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tion of Congress that the President shall proclaim one day each year
as a National Day of Prayer.4" Both houses of Congress have chap-
lains and open their sessions with prayer.4 There is compulsory
chapel at the army, navy, and air force academies." Our official
national motto is "In God we trust."49 The same words appear on
our coins and currency by statutory requirement,5" and they are
sung in our National Anthem. The pledge of allegiance to the flag
includes the words "under God." 5' Sunday observance laws existed
in all the states at about the time of the adoption of the first amend-
ment,52 and still do in almost all the states. "3 Christmas is a legal
holiday,54 and in North Carolina, for example, Easter Monday is a
bank holiday.55 Public schools, colleges and universities have bac-
calaureate services. There are departments of religion in some state
universities. 6 Deductions from income for contributions to religious
organizations are allowed by law for income tax purposes.57 Church
property and income is exempt from taxation.5" These are no
mere collection of isolated examples. They are part of a continuing
stream of religious thought and expression in the life of the nation.
They are part of the American tradition. They demonstrate that
neither was there in the beginning nor is there now a wall of separa-
tion between our government and religion.59 This position is sub-
stantiated by an opinion in 1892 by the Supreme Court in which it
of President Kennedy to his countrymen was his Thanksgiving Day Proclama-
tion issued November 4, 1963, In it he recalled that "our first President in
the first year of his first administration proclaimed November 26, 1789, as
'a day of public thanksgiving and prayer."' Pres. Proc. No. 3560, 28 Fed.
Reg. 11871 (1963).
"66 Stat. 64 (1952), 36 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
' Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
,Id. at 437 n.1 (concurring opinion).
"70 Stat. 732 (1956), 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1958).
" 69 Stat. 290 (1955), 31 U.S.C. § 324a (1958).
.168 Stat. 249 (1954), 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1958).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961).
r3 Id. at 435.
5'52 Stat. 1246 (1938), 5 U.S.C. §86a (1958).
r'N.C. GnN. STAT. § 103-4 (1958).
"Including the University of North Carolina.
'7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c).
"Such laws, state and federal, are cited and discussed by Paulsen, Prefer-
mient of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949).
" Much less has any such wall been kept "high and impregnable" as the
Court said it must be. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
19641
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summarized important historical documents and practices 0 verifying
its conclusion that "this is a religous nation.""1
Our presidents, courts and legislatures have acknowledged our
dependence on God and invoked his aid. The tradition was continued
by President Lyndon Johnson when, on the tragic day of the assas-
sination of President Kennedy, Johnson concluded his brief airport
statement to the American people with the words, "I ask your help,
and God's." ' Like our revolutionary forefathers who framed the
Constitution, President Johnson sought the support of God at a time
of great crisis, and did not seem worried about thus lending the
prestige of government to belief in Him. Acknowledging their
dependence on God and seeking His blessing is what the school
children did in reciting the Regents' prayer. In so doing they were
completely in accord with the concensus of religious beliefs found
in those utterances and manifestations which are part of our religious
tradition and its official expression.
Briefly, by way of review, the Court has repeatedly stated
that the first amendment erects a wall of separation between
church and state, and has interpreted this to mean separation be-
tween religion and government. It has said, however erroneously,
that the purpose of the amendment was to create a complete
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or sup-
port for religion. It has indicated that the power, prestige and
financial support of government may not be put behind a particular
religious belief. Further, not only may there be no aid to one religion,
there may be no aid to all religions. If the Court adheres consistently
to such principles, what will the effect be on the many expressions of
religion in our public life?
Chaplains for legislatures and the armed forces, and compulsory
chapel in the army, navy, and air force academies, are plainly incon-
sistent with a "wall of separation" between religion and govern-
ment, and it is also clear that in these instances "the power, prestige
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular
"o Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-71
(1892).
" Id. at 470. Governmental expressions, practices and laws favorable to
religion are listed in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437-43 (1962) (con-
curring opinion), and also in the dissenting opinion, 370 U.S. at 446-50." N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 1, cols. 2 & 3.
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religious belief," namely belief in God. 3 In a footnote in School
Dist. v. Schempp,0 4 the Court stated that it was not passing upon
a situation such as military service where unless the government
permits voluntary religious services to be conducted with use of
government facilities, military personnel would be unable to practice
their faiths. This bodes ill for chaplains in legislative bodies and
compulsory chapel in the academies of the armed forces, for no such
rationalization would be applicable to them, nor would it be available
when military units are not stationed in isolated places.
Thanksgiving Day proclamations and laws making Thanksgiving
a legal holiday certainly lend support to a religious belief,,5 namely
that God exists, otherwise there is no one to thank on such a day.
Of course, to avoid reaching an unpopular and perhaps, to the Court,
disastrous conclusion that official Thanksgiving is unconstitutional,
the Court might find a secular purpose for such a day, as it found a
secular purpose as the basis for sustaining Sunday observance laws
against attack on first amendment grounds.6 Doubtless thankfulness
is a human trait to be encouraged, and has psychological and social
value, but thankfulness with no one to thank would be a futile thing
not likely to further any social or psychological values. And what
about Christmas and Easter Monday as legal holidays? These holi-
days are Christian in origin and present meaning, although the Court
might conceivably sustain Christmas as an aid to commerce. Doubt-
less it is, but such a judicial recognition of the corruption of the
meaning of Christmas would be no forward step.
6 7
May there be Christmas and Easter observances in the public
schools? If these days so important to children go unobserved, while
63 The writer of a note in 24 OHio ST. L.J. 173, 177 (1963), thought that
prayer in convening the sessions of Congress may well be a violation of the
Constitution under the decision in Ezgel, but doubted whether any party
would have standing to challenge the practice.
:'374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963).
'In the 1963 Thanksgiving Day proclamation of President John F. Ken-
nedy are the words, "On that day let us gather in sanctuaries dedicated to
worship.... ." Pres. Proc. No. 3560, 28 Fed. Reg. 11871 (1963). Surely this
was governmental support for religion.
" Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinly, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
07 "Christmas, I suppose, is still a religious celebration, not merely a day
put on the calendar for the benefit of merchants." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 442 n.8 (1962) (concurring opinion).
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much to-do is made over Columbus Day, Veterans' Day and
Arbor Day, the children are likely to absorb the impression that
their schools disfavor religion, not that the schools are neutral. But
to observe them as anything but days of religious significance would
be to distort their meaning and again leave the impression of hostility
to religion.6"
Baccalaureate services are occasions where public schools and
colleges give expression to a religious point of view; that is what
such services are for. Our national motto and its presence on coins
and in our national anthem are inconsistent with any "wall of separa-
tion" between religion and government, and they put the power,
prestige and financial support of government behind a particular
religious belief, namely that we do trust in God. Equally inconsistent
with the Court's announced principles is our pledge of allegiance to
the flag. Our presidents apparently have been violating the constitu-
tion in their inaugural addresses for generations, for their expres-
sions of faith in God beyond doubt have put the power, prestige,
and to some degree, the financial support of government behind belief
in God. And what of such great utterances as the Declaration of
Independence, with its avowal that men are endowed by their Creator
with unalienable rights, and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which ex-
horted the people to resolve "that this nation, under God, shall
have a new birth of freedom?" True, the Court in a footnote in
E ngel6" indicated that school children might be officially encouraged
to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such
as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the
Diety, and the Court conceded in the same footnote that there are
many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. The Court
referred to these as patriotic or ceremonial occasions. But suppose
someone were to take the glowing religious spirit in these documents
seriously and recite them meaning every word, and not as a mere
patriotic or ceremonial expression? Would the Constitution then
be violated ?7o And even though these great utterances of the past may
" See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 578, 593 (1962).
370 U.S. at 435 n.21.
The question may seem fanciful, but Sutherland, supra note 24, at 37
n.34, brings out that after the Engel decision the New York Commissioner
of Education forbade the Hicksville public schools to use part of the third
verse of the Star Spangled Banner as an official prayer, but allowed it to
be sung or recited. Perhaps the Commissioner, in permitting the words to be
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be recited, from now on no more such great utterances may be made
by our leaders in their official capacities in times of national crisis if
the Court is to be taken at its word.
It may be argued in connection with some of these practices that
their effect in impairing the requirement of separation of religion
from government and in putting the power, prestige and financial
support of government behind a religious belief is minimal, and the
Court may perhaps not invalidate them for that reason. However,
in Engel the Court considered the view that the Regents' prayer
was so brief and general that it created no danger to freedom of
religion, and the Court answered by quoting Madison: "[I]t is
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." 1 This
leaves the Court in a position to take alarm at even our national
motto and our flag salute if it wants to. Nor would the fact that
some of the religious practices in our public life, such as Thanks-
giving Day proclamations, have been of long standing prevent the
Court from taking belated alarm at them. As already pointed out,
prayer and Bible reading have existed in our schools from the
beginning of the nation, and in many of our public schools since their
infancy.
It may also be argued that in the case of some of the expressions
of religion in our public life no one would have standing to sue to
prevent the practices, and therefore no case could be presented to the
Court wherein it could hold them unconstitutional. Such an obstacle
furnishes no secure barrier against such holdings by the Court unless
it wants to find such a barrier.72 The Court in the Schempp case 3
made the point that the laws and practices there involved could be
challenged only by persons having standing to complain, but found
such standing in school children and their parents although they
were not obliged to participate in the prayer and Bible reading. If
used in song but not in prayer, overlooked the fact that prayers are frequently
sung or chanted.
71 370 U.S. at 436. Again in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963), the Court said that it was no defense that the religious practices
were minor encroachments on the first amendment, and used the same quo-
tation from Madison.
"' Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L.
Rnv. 1, 17-22 (1961), discusses the problem of standing to sue, and notes
that sometimes the Court ignores the problem. He finds in the Court's de-
cisions on the matter a confusing diversity rather than clear precedent.
73374 U.S. at 224 n.9.
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the Court were to conclude that any of the various expressions of
religion in our public life amount to an establishment of religion it
could find that such establishment put official and public pressure
against the views of a dissenter, such as an atheist, and interfered
with his right to be free from any such governmental establishment
and its pressures toward conformity, and that this impairment of his
rights gave him standing to sue.74
In support of the Courts' position it can be argued that although
the framers of the first amendment did not have in mind such results
as outlawing prayer and Bible reading in the schools, still changes in
the character and religious beliefs of our population justify different
results in the application of the old principles contained in the
amendment. 75 With the immigration of people from all over the
world there have come to this country groups whose religions are
diverse, and there is a strong moral case, so it can be argued, against
conducting in the public schools religious exercises which are con-
trary to the beliefs of children and their parents belonging to various
minority groups. Thus the Court's position, though it be a departure
from previous concepts of what the first amendment requires can be
ascribed to a growing public and judicial sensitivity to the beliefs
and feelings of all manner of people, and a mounting belief that
respect for the inherent worth and dignity of every person requires
that his religious views be not affronted in our public institutions and
practices. As we grow more truly moral old principles gain greater
content.
Such a moral case for the Court's expansion of the meaning
of the first amendment is appealing. But decent regard for the religi-
ous beliefs of other people is not a moral requirement only on majori-
ties in their conduct toward minorities. Such a moral principle also
makes its demands on minorities in their relations with majorities.
The minority groups which have come to this country from many
lands to enjoy the religious freedom which prevails here do not
themselves display any great sensitivity to the feelings and beliefs
of others when they set about impeaching the expression in our
' Sutherland, supra note 24, at 35 raises the question, "Where a state
does something amounting to 'establishment', will the Supreme Court enjoin
it on the suit of any member of society who dislikes the policy ?"
'5 Such a view was expressed by justice Brennan. School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 42
THE PRAYER DECISIONS
public life of the the religious views which have from the beginning
been part of the American tradition. The Jew or Moslem or Bud-
dhist may choose to witness with tolerance practices in which he does
not participate, and when he does so he gives better witness for his
own religion than when he seeks to suppress the religious practices
which are traditional in the public life of the people among whom he
dwells. Such religious expressions can be respected without being
embraced. When a Christian people 6 opens its doors to men of all
views and creeds, affording them the religious freedom denied them
in other lands, that people ought not by so doing to lose its right to
carry out its own previous practices because the newcomers hold
different religious views.
Moreover, the minorities which seek by lawsuits to remove
expression of our religious tradition from our public life may in the
end help destroy the foundations of the religious freedom in the name
of which they make their attacks."" The American people from the
beginning have grounded their belief in freedom on their religious
faith. The Declaration of Independence asserted that men are
endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights, including liberty.
The Preamble to the Constitution of North Carolina recites, "We,
the people of the State of North Carolina, grateful to Almighty
God . ..for .. . the existence of our civil, political and religious
liberties, and acknowledging our dependence upon Him for the
continuance of those blessings ..."'s Comparable provisions are to
be found in the constitutions of other states."' In the Gettysburg
address Lincoln called upon the people to resolve: "[T]hat this
nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom ..... ,0 Presi-
dent Kennedy in his inaugural address declared: "The world is very
different now .... And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which
our forbears fought are still at issue around the Globe-the belief that
"' Griswold, supra note 24, at 173-74, points out that virtually all of the
immigrants who came to this country by the time of the adoption of the
Constitution were Christian.
" "This... has been, and is, a Christian country, in origin, history, tra-
dition and culture. It was out of Christian doctrine and ethics, I think it
can be said, that it developed its notion of toleration." Id. at 176.
N.C. CONST. preamble.
Justice Froessell in Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 176 N.E.2d
579, 582, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659, 663 (1961) (concurring opinion), points to a
similar provision in the Preamble to the Constitution of New York and adds
that virtually every state constitution contains similar references.
" Am. JtR. 2D, DEsx Boo< 76 (1962).
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the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from
the hand of God." '81 Religious convictions are the declared founda-
tion of our American liberties. If our public life may no longer
embody and declare such religious convictions then they can no longer
effectively play their historic role in furnishing the foundation for our
belief in freedom.
The prayer and Bible reading held invalid in the Court's prayer
decisions were wholly voluntary. No pupil was obliged to participate
or even to be present. Each enjoyed religious freedom in the matter.
In his concurring opinion in the Schempp case,82 however, Justice
Brennan pointed out that the participation of the group as a whole
puts a pressure on each child to participate since there is in children
a desire to conform. Justice Brennan amassed behind this familiar
fact an impressive array of support from behavioral scientists show-
ing that children are disinclined to flout "peer-group norms." 83
It is true that withdrawal from the opening exercises in the
school marks the withdrawing child as someone different from the
group. However, the Jew, the atheist, and members of other
minority groups are persons who are different and intend to be. If
their children are to become members of such groups they will have
to choose to be different also, and to resist their inclinations to con-
formity with the mass. The student who asks to be excused from
attendance on a Jewish holiday voluntarily marks himself as differ-
ent, but no one contends that all the other students should be excused
too so that no one will notice that the Jew is a Jew. No constitutional
provision can protect persons who are different from being seen to be
different. We cannot by constitutional provision protect a child from
being black or white, male or female. If the public schools were to
try to convince the children that they are all the same color, sex, or
religion the schools would be trying to implant patently absurd
notions. If the schools lead the children to understand that they are
diverse in many ways, but that no one should be subjected to any
disesteem, indignity or rejection on account of such diversity they
will be preparing the pupils for life in a democracy such as ours with
its great variety of people.
" LOTT, THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 269
(1961).
82374 U.S. at 289-92.
83 Id. at 290.
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If the influx of minority groups does not afford a convincing
basis for the Court's version of the meaning of the first amendment,
can its version be justified by pointing to a change in attitude on the
part of the people as a whole? It is said that it is a constitution which
the Court is expounding."4 By this is meant that the document con-
tains broad principles which have to be adapted to the changed condi-
tions and views of later generations. s 5 It is true that the United
States Constitution, although it is a written one, is in operation
partly an unwritten one. What it means depends not just upon its
literal words and the intent of those who enacted them; the inter-
pretation arises partly out of the life of the people. Their deeply held
convictions on fundamental principles may change and develop, and
the changes may represent permanent growth, not mere transient
fluctuations in public opinion. Their way of life may also change,
requiring new adaptations of old constitutional provisions.
No such considerations support the principles laid down by the
Court as to the scope and meaning of the religion provisions of the
first amendment. There is no movement in our national life with
which the decisions keep the Constitution up to date. The decisions
keep the Constitution up to date only with the changing views of the
Court. There is nothing to show that the people have changed their
deeply held views on the relation of government and religion. As
already brought out, with numerous examples, there has been -up to
the present moment a continuous interrelationship between the
religious convictions of the people and their public institutions, life,
and official pronouncements. Chaplains in the armed forces and legis-
lative bodies, Thanksgiving Day proclamations, Christmas and
Easter Holidays, baccalaureate services in the public schools and
colleges, and the like are still part of the American scene and will be
unless the Court says, "No." It was in 1954 that the words "under
God" were added to the pledge of allegiance to the flag, 6 and in
1956 Congress made "In God we trust" our national motto. 7 The
report of a nationwide Gallup Poll dated August 11, 1962 showed that
8,Id. at 241 (concurring opinion).
a "We can live in the atomic age under a horse-and-buggy constitution
only because the Supreme Court has kept the Constitution up to date, so to
speak, through constant revision by means of interpretation." Konvitz, supra
note 40, at 50.
:068 Stat. 249 (1954), 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1958).
8770 Stat. 732 (1956), 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1958).
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80 per cent of parents of public school children approved religious ob-
servances in the public schools and only 14 per cent disapproval. The
figures for the views of all people were 79 per cent approval, 14 per-
cent disapproval.
The reverent, spontaneous, nationwide turning of our people to
God in the dark days following the assassination of President
Kennedy showed that religious faith is still an inextricable part of
our national life. This turning to God for guidance, this spontaneous
upsurge of prayer, was participated in by multitudes of people, and
also by their government officials speaking in their official capacities.
There was no separation of government from religion in this time of
crisis, and it is fortunate for our country that there was not. One of
history's recurrent and most insistent lessons is that when a people's
spiritual life wanes their nation perishes.
The American people do indeed believe in separation of church
and state, and this writer shares the belief. We want no church
established by the state. But the people do not want separation of
belief in God from our public life, as they have abundantly demon-
strated. Every prayer and expression of faith in God is not neces-
sarily a church.
The writer does not believe that the Court is authorized to make
its own views as to policy into constitutional requirements, never-
theless the underlying policy concerning exclusion of prayer and Bible
reading in the public schools will be further examined. First, is
there a need for a national policy in the matter which ought to be
enforced on all localities? There is diversity of general opinion con-
cerning allowing or forbidding such prayer and Bible reading,"" just
as there has been diversity in the holdings of the state courts on the
subject. Most of the state courts have sustained such practices s0
Since there are different views and local practices, there is no visible
reason why one view and one policy ought to be imposed. 0
Far the most serious criticism of the Court's decisions and
opinions concerning the application of the religion provisions of the
first amendment to public school education is that the Court is
" The divergent opinions of important persons, religious groups and
publications are noted by Butler, The Regent's Prayer Case: In the Estab-
lishment Clause "No Means No," 49 A.B.A.J. 444 (1963).
"16 VAND. L. REv. 205, 206-07 (1962).
" Baker, The Supreme Court and the Freedom of Religion M6lange, 49
A.B.A.J. 439 (1963); see Griswold, supra note 24, at 173.
[Vol. 42
THE PRAYER DECISIONS
making a major contribution to the secularization of our way of
thinking. The Court is sensitive to the religious conflicts of
earlier centuries and to the persecutions of dissenters when particular
religions were officially established." This historical background
weighs heavily in the Court's decisions on the meaning of the
religion provisions of the first amendment. The Court, though, does
not appear to be equally sensitive to a far more deadly conflict of
global dimensions going on in our own time. It will be tragic if by
over-extension of constitutional provisions arising out of the religi-
ous conflicts of earlier centuries the Court prevents the people from
coping successfully with the perils of a desperate idealogical conflict
in our own day.
Part of the present all pervading world-wide clash called the cold
war is a conflict of basic ideas about the nature of man and the
final nature of reality. From ancient times materialists have held the
view that the ultimate reality in the universe is matter and force.
Man himself is but matter and force in highly intricate arrangement.
Opposed to materialism has been the religious view that the final
reality is God, Who is infinite Mind and Spirit. The essential nature
of man is not in the matter of which he is composed, but is in his
mind and spirit, made in the image of God. The twentieth century
has seen a mounting tide of secularistic thought, i.e., thought ex-
cluding religion. Communism is a militantly materialistic and
avowedly atheistic ideology, which has already impressed its beliefs
on a considerable portion of mankind, and proposes to capture the
minds of all men. To do so it is pressing its world revolution. But
materialism and secularism are not confined to communists. They
are pervading also the thought of the non-communist world. In this
country one reason is the change in the nature of education in the
schools.
In the early years of this nation's life the schools were largely
established and maintained by religious groups, and religion and
religious versions of truth were part of the thought presented in the
schools. Then came the rise of the system of public schools founded
and supported by government. Being secular in origin, what they
taught became increasingly secular. 2 Now the Supreme Court in the
"1Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1962). See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
" See Comment, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 240, 246 (1963). In Illinois ex rel.
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name of the first amendment is insisting that education in the public
schools be wholly secular. 3 The inevitable result will be further
secularization of our ways of thinking. 4 Plainly if from the first
grade through college a student is presented all knowledge and all
thought from a purely secular viewpoint, in the end his thought about
all realities, including himself, will be secular in nature. This follows
logically, and the logic is verified by what is going on in American
ways of thinking. Newspapers, magazines, books, radio and tele-
vision, the media through which the people express their thought,
increasingly reflect the secular nature of our thinking. To develop
in detail this point would require more than the space here available,
but the point will be illustrated by one extremely important example.
Basic in the life of any people are its convictions concerning what
is morally right and what is wrong. There are many secular versions
of the nature of right and wrong. One of these is that what is right
and wrong for a particular people at any given time is a matter of
their accepted beliefs. These vary. For example, the ancient Ger-
manic tribes, the Japanese in the Middle Ages, and the American
people of today have had widely different beliefs as to the nature of
right. The set of beliefs of each group constitute what is right for
that group. As the beliefs of the group change, right for them
changes also. Right is the mores of a time and place.
Such a version of right makes moral nomads of the human race.
Since there is no right existing as a reality in and of itself, there is no
moral destination for humanity and no moral progress since there is
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948), Justice Frank-
furter, concurring, refers to "The sharp confinement of the public schools
to secular education .... "
" "Our constitutional policy ... does not deny the value or the necessity
for religious training, teaching or observance. Rather it secures their free
exercise. But to that end it does deny that the state can undertake or sustain
them in any form or degree." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218
(1963), quoting with approval from a dissenting opinion in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947).
"Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of educa-
tion, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment." Id. at 225.
(Emphasis added.)
" In Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 184, 176 N.E.2d 579, 583, 218
N.Y.S.2d 659, 664 (1961), Justice Burke, concurring, referring to the con-
tention that the first amendment requires rejection of any religious element
in the public schools, wrote, "This, of course, would force on the children
a culture that is founded upon secularist dogma."
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no right to progress toward. If all the people come to accept evil
practices, then the practices cease to be evil. Being accepted they
become a new mores. When a Kinsey report shows that most Ameri-
can men have sex relations outside marriage, 95 we ought not to
condemn such practices as wrong. Thus any imaginable moral evil
can justify itself by becoming widespread enough. Nevertheless this
variety of thinking is permeating popular thought and expression,
and we hear much about shifting moral values, as if such shifts were
self justifying.
Such views have consequences. If people are persuaded that
there are no right and wrong existing as such, but only current
beliefs, the obligation to do right is relaxed, since we may as well
change our moral beliefs to more pleasureable ones. The general
moral decline in our time, with its rapidly growing crime rate," has
accompanied the loosening of moral convictions. But of course if
right is only the mores of time and place there is no moral decline,
just a new kind of mores.
Vastly different from this and other secular versions of right and
wrong and far more exacting is the religious version. Great religions
of the world teach that right and wrong, good and evil, are realities
in and of themselves and that righteousness is part of the nature of
the supreme mind and spirit, God, Who is the ultimate reality in the
universe. God requires of man that he do right and abstain from
wrong. From this viewpoint the deliberate wrongdoer puts himself
in defiance of reality, as does one who jumps from the top of a tall
building in defiance of the law of gravity.
The writer believes that a far better case can be made for this
version of right than for any secular one; further that morality wanes
when the religious version is discarded. Washington in his Fare-
well Address warned: "[R]eason and experience both forbid us to
expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principle. '9 7 Nevertheless, under the Supreme Court's version of the
"KINSEY, POMEROY AND MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE 392 (1948).
" Serious crimes reported increased ninety-eight per cent between 1950
and 1960. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1960). Part of the increase is
obviously due to population growth, but crime outstripped population growth
by over four to one.
"' Quoted in School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 280 n.56 (1963)
(concurring opinion). Jefferson regarded religion as the alpha and omega of
the moral law. Corwin, supra note 23, at 14.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
first amendment, religion cannot be taught as truth in public schools.
Courses can be taught about religion, but religion cannot be taught. "
Secular versions of all reality may be taught as truth; religious
verisons as such may not be, if our public school education is to be
secular.
The Court has intimated that the place for religion is the church
and home, not the public school. 9 Many agree. It cannot be gain-
said that home influence is critical in the training of a child. Why,
then, do we not leave secular instruction to the home? Because if
that were done the great majority of children would be poorly edu-
cated. Parents have neither the time nor the knowledge required
to educate their children in all the manifold subjects which make up
their secular education from the first grade through college. It must
be remembered that education of a religious nature does not include
only the instillation of religious belief. It includes presenting bodies
of knowledge from a religious standpoint, not a purely secular one.
How many parents are qualified to do this? For example, in the
matter of the nature of right and wrong, already noted, how many
parents are qualified to teach the various secular versions, such as
utilitarianism, pragmatism, moral relativity, and ideological concepts
of right and wrong such as those found in Nazism and communism,
and to show that all of these are inadequate and incomplete without
the truths contributed by religion? Or suppose a parent does not
accept psychological determinism, with its teaching that conduct
depends on such factors as heredity and environment, and that
individual power of choice in making moral decisions is a myth.10
Suppose the parent thinks that acceptance of such a doctrine leads to
individual irresponsibility and is a corrupting influence on persons
and societies. Assuming that the average parent knows that there is
such a thing as psychological determinism, how many would be
o, School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
See id. at 226, and the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, 374 U.S.
at 230, 273-74. See also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 218, 220 (1948) (concurring opinion).
"' "[I]n certain psychiatric groups, it has become a sign of modernity and
scientific maturity to go all out for determinism, to believe that man is a
helpless victim of his genes and his environment." Guttmacher, The Psy-
chiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 633,
635 (1958). In Hartung, A Critique of the Sociological Approach to Crime
and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 703, 725 (1958), free will is
referred to as mysticism.
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qualified to show that it is only a disputed theory, not established
truth, and that the individual's responsibility for his moral choices
taught by religion is part of the total truth? From the practical
standpoint the education of children in the various subjects of study
will be received in the schools, which for most children means the
public schools. If all the subjects are presented in school from a
purely secular standpoint, the child becomes an adult with a secular
outlook on reality as a whole, with his religion narrowed to an area
of diminishing importance. The communists, being unqualified
materialists and secularists, have gone all the way and ascribe to
religion no importance at all.
It is true that the churches afford religious education in the
Sunday schools. These are of great value. But when a young person
is taught secular courses by paid teachers educated for the purpose, is
compelled by law to attend, and in high school and college is taught
by persons expert in particular fields of secular knowledge, some of
them outstanding authorities in these fields, all of them paid profes-
sional people, and such study is the students' full time occupation
until he reaches adult life, all supported by the vast resources of
government, the volunteer Sunday school teacher, given half an
hour of the students' time a week if he chooses to attend, is under a
considerable handicap.
The parent who wants his child to be instructed in various fields
of knowledge in the light of religious understanding can, legally,
send his child to a school or college maintained by a church or religi-
ous organization.' 0 ' The Supreme Court has held that a state may
not require that school attendance be at a public school.'0 2 But juris-
prudential experience shows that an abstract legal freedom of choice
does not result in actual freedom to choose if economic necessity
dictates the choice.'0 3 To most of our citizens the choice to set up
denominational schools and send their children to them is not a free
choice. Parents in their capacity as taxpayers must contribute to
public schools and colleges. If a group of religious persons wants to
maintain a denominational school for their children, and besides that
... See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
.2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
.03 See Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rides and Doc-
trines, 27 HARV. L. REv. 195, 195-98 (1914).
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are obliged as taxpayers to contribute to the public schools their
children do not attend, they carry a heavy double burden. The result
is that most students receive public school education, which means
secular education. Religious persons are being compelled to pay for
teaching a secular version of truth whether they like it or not.
The Court's insistence on secularization of public school edu-
cation is part of its more general insistence on secularization in law
and governmental activity. The Court has held that laws banning
commercial activities on Sunday do not violate the first amend-
ment. 04 Its opinion in the first of the companion cases on the subject
brought out that at about the time of the adoption of the first amend-
ment each of the states had laws restricting work on Sunday, 05 and
almost every state now has some type of such Sunday regulation.100
This should have sufficed for the decision of the case, because such an
almost universal practice showed that the first amendment was not
intended to invalidate such laws, nor was the fourteenth, nor is there
any shift in public beliefs and practices justifying a changed inter-
pretation of the first amendment to make it condemn such laws. But
the Court chose to go on to find that there was a secular purpose to be
served by a weekly day of rest, and to hold the Sunday laws valid
by reason of such secular purpose. Thus the Court, without any
necessity for so doing in order to decide the case, read into the first
amendment a prohibition of state laws which serve religious purposes
without being justified by secular objectives.
The Court has held that the first amendment does not prohibit a
state from spending tax funds to pay bus fares of parochial school
pupils as part of a general program for paying bus fares for children
to go to school'O 7 The Court said that the state could not contribute
tax funds to support an institution which teaches the tenets of any
church, 08 but viewed paying the bus fares as an aid to parents in
getting their children, regardless of their religion, safely to school.
The Court had earlier held that tax funds could be used to supply
free school books to school children, although some of the children
went to sectarian schools. The books were not religious in nature and
"o Cases cited note 66 supra.
. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1960).
" See id. at 435.




were for the use of the children, not the schools. 10 9 The Court in the
Schempp case, citing its decisions on Sunday laws and bus trans-
portation, said flatly, "[T] o withstand the strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.""10
The people are sensitive to the danger arising from the seculari-
zation of our system of education, and have resorted to various
devices to prevent religion from being kept out. One scheme has been
a program whereby for one class period each week children whose
parents so desired were released from their regular classes to attend,
in the school building, classes for religious instruction by persons
supplied for the purpose by religious groups. A plan of this kind was
held invalid by the Court as contrary to the establishment clause."'
The Court, however, held valid a similar scheme which provided for
religious classes off the school premises. 11 2 Prayer and Bible reading
as part of opening exercises are another device to bring religion into
the educational system."3 Such devices as these are woefully in-
adequate to offset the secular nature of the instruction in the regular
classes, but at least they prevent the children from absorbing the
impression that religion has no truth at all to offer if it is given no
place in their education. Some state universities have departments of
religion," 4 but these are under a serious handicap if they must only
teach about religion, and may not teach religion. Other departments
may offer their intellectual wares as truth, but departments of
0' Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
10 374 U.S. at 222. (Emphasis added.)
"Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
The released time plan is discussed by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 222-25.
12 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REsv.
578, 594 (1962), refers to a "shared time" arrangement receiving limited trial
in Pennsylvania, under which students are allowed to take "objective" courses
such as mathematics and the physical sciences in public school while taking
"value content" courses such as social studies and religion in parochial
schools.
. By 1962 at least twenty-two states had by statute or court decision
required or permitted either Bible reading or prayer or both in the public
schools. Only a few states had expressly prohibited either one. See Com-
ment, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 73, 87 (1963).
... The teaching of religion in state colleges and universities is discussed
by Louisell and Jackson, Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education,
50 CALIF. L. REv. 751 (1962). The authors argue that "The dialogue of an
intellectual community is not complete without the participation of theology."
Id. at 792.
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religion may not, if they are confined to showing what various
religions are and may not show that there is any truth in them.
Religious educational institutions are indirectly subsidized by
government in many ways, such as tax exemption 5 and deductions
of contributions to them from income for income tax purposes."0
The recent federal legislation setting up an approximately 1,200,-
000,000 dollar program to help colleges build classrooms, laborator-
ies and libraries makes the program available to privately endowed
and church connected schools as well as those publicly owned and
financed.11 7 Perhaps the only way of putting religious schools and
wholly secular schools on exactly the same basis would be for school
tax laws to provide that the taxpayer may designate whether his pay-
ment is to go to secular schools or some designated denominational
school. If, as the Court has decided, he may send his children to a paro-
chial school, why not his money? At least this would embody in prac-
tice the declared principle against forcing a person to pay for teaching
what he does not believe." 8 However, the purpose of this article is
not to present or advocate particular plans for keeping religion from
being pushed out of the education of our children. Such plans are
emerging out of the give and take of popular movements and views.
The purpose of the people to find ways and means, consistent with
their religious liberty, of preserving their religious beliefs now im-
perilled in the worldwide ideological struggle, should not be thwarted
by the Supreme Court in the name of principles read into, rather
than derived from, the first amendment. The people are trying to
reconcile the great values of religious freedom with the great values
of religion. It is a task the Court cannot perform. The Court should
. See Paulsen, supra note 58.
" INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
11777 Stat. 363 (1963). This legislation appears to fall within the con-
demnation of the Court's declaration: "No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice re-
ligion." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), quoted in
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948). If
the Court were to hold this legislation unconstitutional such a decision would
make an additional road block in the way of working out solutions for the
problem of avoiding the danger of secularization while preserving religious
freedom.
... See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 60 (1947) (dissenting
opinion of four Justices).
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not needlessly raise constitutional obstacles to its performance. 119
That the people can work out the problem of the place of religion in
our national life was illustrated when for the first time a Catholic
was elected President of the United States. The Court could hardly
have required the election of an occasional Catholic as President as
a means of eliminating in practice religious qualifications for office.
It is uncertain what the Court will decide as to the validity of the
many interrelationships between religion and government it has not
yet passed upon, some of them enumerated in this discussion, if cases
calling them into question come before the Court. If it applies the
principles it has stated requiring the complete separation of govern-
ment from religion it will invalidate many of the manifestations of
religion in our public life. But the Court has not consistently adhered
to the position that there must be an impregnable wall of separation
between religion and government. As previously indicated, the Court
long ago pointed to the religious influence which has been part of
the country's history and tradition, and concluded that "this is a
religious nation."' 20 The Court and individual justices have re-
peatedly noted the many fashions in which religious belief is
incorporated into our official pronouncements and public life.' 2 In
Zorach v. Clauson'12 the Court declared that the first amendment
does not say that in all respects there shall be separation of church
and state, 12 3 and in the same case the Court said: "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. ' 1123a It may
be that the Court will not press on with decisions eliminating religion
from our public life.
One problem remains. What can be done about the prayer
11. There is a wide difference between a broad interpretation of consti-
tutional principles to enable the people to realize their purposes through the
action of their representative bodies, and a broad interpretation to deny them
such realization of their purposes, especially so vital and proper a purpose as
that of preserving a spiritual outlook on life against the rising worldwide
tide of materialism.
1"0 See note 61 supra.
2. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446-50 (1962) (dissenting opinion); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 253-55 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
122343 U.S. 306 (1952).
... Id. at 312. In School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963),
justice Brennan, concurring, tentatively suggests certain religious mani-
festations in our public life which may not be unconstitutional.
"" 343 U.S. at 313.
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decisions? And if the Court does make further decisions holding un-
constitutional traditional manifestations of religion in our public life,
what can be done about that, if it turns out that the people want no
such destruction of the American tradition?
One course is disobedience. Constitutional requirements have in
the past been abolished by the people through the process of dis-
regarding them. Thus at the turn of the century legislation for the
improvement of the condition of workers was frequently held un-
constitutional by the courts on the ground that the legislation im-
paired the freedom of contract guaranteed by the Constitution.
Nevertheless the tide of popular support for such legislation continued
to rise, and in the end it was the courts which gave way and changed
their decisions.' 24 At one time the courts held invalid the use of
subpoenas by administrative agencies in making investigations not
related to adjudicating cases or law enforcement. But popular at-
titudes and statutes reflecting them persisted in supporting such
power in administrative agencies without the limitations imposed by
the courts, and again it was the court decisions which changed.1
25
The people drank the eighteenth amendment out of the Consti-
tution. But it is uncertain whether there will be any such revolt
against the Court's spiritual prohibitions as there was against the
prohibition of alcoholic beverages. The type of person who believes
most strongly in religious values is likely also to be foremost in
respect for law, and to realize that general disregard for law is itself
an evil. Disobedience to law as laid down by the Court is not a
remedy to be advocated with any enthusiasm.
There is the remedy of amending the Constitution, and after the
first prayer decision literally dozens of amendments on the subject
were proposed in Congress. 26 But it is hard to capture the full
American tradition on the matter of the relationship between govern-
ment and religion in any short set of words to be inserted in the
Constitution. Of course, though, specific decisions can be overturned
by specific constitutional amendments. The Constitution could be so
... See Pound, supra note 103.
.. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATVE LAw § 31 (1951).
"' Sutherland, supra note 24, at 50-51. He states that there were "fifty
or so" amendments to overrule the prayer decision in the Engel case. Butler,
supra note 88, at 444, states that one of the proposed amendments had the




amended as to provide that nothing in the Constitution shall be
interpreted to prohibit prayer and Bible reading in the public schools.
But the Constitution is not the place to provide and change specific
rules of law, it is instead the place for basic principles. What is
needed more than a new amendment is a construction of our present
first amendment which does not do violence to tradition.
Reexamination of the powers and functions of the Court by the
people and by the Court could be fruitful. The Court ought not to
sit as a continuing constitutional convention. The constitutional
function of the Court is not to make the Constitution. The Judicial
power extends only to cases and controversies. 2 7 In cases concern-
ing the religion provisions of the first amendment the Court at times
has seemed more concerned with announcing constitutional doctrines
than with simply deciding the case at hand on the basis of principles
necessary to the decision. Thus in the bus transporation case 28 the
Court, besides pointing out that the bus fares were paid for the
purpose of getting the children safely to school, which was the basis
for the decision, said by way of dictum,
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."'
129
Most of what the Court said in this often quoted dictum had very
little to do with whether school authorities could pay bus fares to
transport children to parochial schools, which was what the Court
""U.S. CONsT. art. III, §2 (1); Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
t 8 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19 Id. at 15-16.
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had before it to decide. But in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ.13 0 the Court held that the classes in religion on the school
premises fell under the ban of the first amendment, "as we inter-
preted it in Everson [the bus case] ... ." Then the Court repeated the
above quoted statement from Everson.3' Thus the Court in the bus
case made statements vastly beyond the case before it, and then used its
statements as authority for a later holding.
Of course interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution
applicable in a particular case requires some creativity. If no such
case as a particular one before the Court has been decided by it
before, the decision will add something to the content and meaning
of the constitutional provision involved. However, the creativity
should be within the guide lines of the constitutional provisions and
their intended meaning. Interpretation should not become invention.
One who reads the religion decisions of the Court is likely to be
impressed with the sincerity of the Court's views and with the fact
that it has conscientiously sought to promote what it conceives to be
policy best serving the national well being. But convictions of a
Court are not necessarily constitutional requirements. 18 2 Consti-
tutional fundamentals ought not to shift with transient currents of
public opinion, much less should they shift with the changing person-
nel of a court.133 Further, the constitutional function of the Court is
not a matter properly to be decided by turning the issue into a debate
on the relative merits of a "broad" construction of the Constitution
versus a "narrow" construction.:' The question is one of the Court's
constitutional power. Going beyond that power cannot be justified
by labeling the result "broad construction."
If it be true that rapid, even revolutionary changes in our way
of life and our beliefs make imperative constitutional changes which
.. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11"1Id. at 210-11.
... Justice Holmes wrote concerning the fourteenth amendment: "I can-
not believe that the Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to
embody our economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions." Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (dissenting opinion).
"' "All these cases reveal the justices at sixes and sevens in interpreting
religious liberty. Their interpretations involve shadings and nuances baffling
even the sharpest intellects. They frequently depend on the oscillation of a
justice or two, or the fortuitous advent of a new member to the bench."
Baker, supra note 90, at 442.
"34 Comment, 36 So. CAIir. L. REv. 240 (1963), contrasts the views of
the "broad constructionists" and the "narrow constructionists."
[Vol. 42
THE PRAYER DECISIONS
cannot await the slow and cumbersome process of amending the
Constitution, then serious consideration should be given the question
whether the Supreme Court is the appropriate body for making the
changes. The Preamble to the Constitution indicates that the power
to make the Constitution is in the people. The Court has a narrow
base of representation. Its members are appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.'35 Approval by the
Senate is given in the great majority of cases.136 Further, constitu-
tional changes by the Court cannot be made as need arises, but must
await the bringing of lawsuits. If indeed prayer in the public schools
is unconstitutional, we had this unconstitutional practice for genera-
tions before a few persons decided to bring a lawsuit. We would have
had the practice for the indefinite future if these few private parties
had not gone to court. In their lawsuit conducted by their lawyers
not only were their constitutional rights settled but so were the rights
of millions of persons not before the Court and whose lawyers were
not there either. In his first inaugural address Lincoln said:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Govern-
ment upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal
actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having
to that extent practically resigned their Government into the
hands of that eminent tribunal. 1 37
This statement of Lincoln's may not be favored by many modern
liberals, but at least they are unlikely to prove that he was a member
of the John Birch society.
There have been proposals for curtailing the power of the
Supreme Court.38 It has been proposed that Congress have author-
ity by two-thirds vote to overrule decisions of the Court.'39 The
General Assembly of the States proposed an amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States setting up a Court of the Union
composed of the chief justices of the highest courts of the several
... U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2[2].1.. HYNEMA, TE SUPREME COURT ox TRIAL 45-46 (1963).
.
8 LoTT, THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 121
(1961).1.HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 136, at 48-53.
"' See Sutherland, supra note 24, at 50 n.76. Such proposals are dis-
cussed by HYNEMAN, op. cit. supra note 136, at 52.
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states to review judgments of the Supreme Court relating to the
rights reserved to the states or to the people by the Constitution.'40
Objections to these suggestions are apparent. Against making
Congress the court of last resort is historical experience abundantly
showing that decision of cases by legislative bodies has not worked
well.' 41 The proposal for a Court of the Union has been objected to
on the ground that it would result in adjudication of national consti-
tutional questions, not by a national court, but by judicial representa-
tives of the states. 142 However, there is a converse objection 48 that
the present Supreme Court, resting on a purely national base, is
rapidly destroying the constitutional plan of a federation of states
with a central government confined to the powers granted in the
Constitution, and with the other powers, unless prohibited to the
states, reserved to the states or to the people.' 44 To meet such ob-
jections, a body could be devised with a broad base of representation,
for example, a body composed of representatives one or more to be
appointed by each of the following: the President, Congress, the
Supreme Court, the state governors as a group, and the state chief
justices as a group. The purpose here, however, is not to advocate
any particular plan, but to suggest that if this is an age making rapid
constitutional change necessary and if such changes are to be made
other than by constitutional amendment, there should be careful and
intensive public consideration as to the kind of body which should
exercise such power. If the power is to remain vested in the Supreme
Court this should be the result of a thoroughly considered national
decision, not of inertia in leaving the power with the Court because it
seems to have come to rest there now.
... The General Assembly of the States is a biennial convention of state
legislators and officials sponsored by the Council of State Governments. The
amendment to establish a Court of the Union is one of three amendments
proposed by the Assembly. As of June 17, 1963, this amendment had been
approved by the legislatures of five states. Shanahan, Proposed Constitit-
tional Amendments: They Will Strengthen Federal-State Relations, 49
A.B.A.J. 631 (1963). Mr. Shanahan presents the case for the amendments.
The case against them is presented by Black, Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ments: They Would Return Us to Confederacy, 49 A.B.A.J. 637 (1963)."'Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUm. L. REV. 1, 1-12 (1914).
142 See Black, supra note 140, at 639. Professor Black does a better job
of showing the defects in the suggested amendment than of showing that all
is well at present.
143 See Shanahan, supra note 140.
... U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Concerning future decisions on the constitutionality of particular
aspects of religion in our public life, the best solution may well be
a return by the Court to a policy of judicial self restraint,
145 moti-
vated by a principle of constitutional interpretation to the effect that
long established practices of the people deeply imbedded in their way
of life should not be declared invalid in the name of constitutional
provisions not intended to have any such effect.
'. See Sutherland, supra note 24, at 40-41. The Conference of Chief
Justices (of the state supreme courts) in 1958, by a vote of 36 to 8, adopted
a resolution urging the United States Supreme Court to exercise judicial
self-restraint by recognizing the difference between what the Constitution
may prescribe and that which a majority of the Court may deem desirable
when the Court determines questions as to the extent of national as against
state powers and as to the validity of the exercise of powers reserved to the
states. The resolution of the Conference also approved a committee report
urging self-restraint on the part of the Court and declaring, "[T]he Supreme
Court too often has tended to adopt the role of policy maker without proper
judicial restraint." What 36 State Chief Justices Said About the Supreme
Court, 45 U. S. News and World Report, Oct. 3, 1958, 92.
Judicial self-restraint would be furthered by a change of policy in select-
ing the judges for the Supreme Court. The majority of the members of
the Court should be selected from among the ablest judges to be found on the
state and federal appellate courts. For the country's highest court are needed
those who have demonstrated ability as the country's ablest appellate judges.
judicial self-restraint is likely to be a developed capacity, and to be found
in such judges. Political leaders, eminent practitioners, and law profes-
sors should not make up a majority of the Court. This view is not to be
equated with merely requiring judicial experience for appointees to the
Supreme Court, a much discussed subject. Experience as judges and
achieved eminence as judges are not one and the same.
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